embodied in the American creed." 4 As Huntington argues, the cultural core that nurtures these values has been taken as White Anglo-Saxon Protestantism and the homogeneity of race, religion and ethnicity. 5 After 9/11 the Bush administration evoked the memory of the crusades, and its policies like the Patriot Act, the banning of Islamic organizations, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the institution of Guantanamo Bay all seemed particularly directed against Muslims. Similarly, vigilance toward Muslim visitors and Muslim residents increased.
Immediately following 9/11, hate crimes against Muslims and those of the Middle Eastern ancestry jumped by 1600 percent. Although no longer so dramatic or frequent, Muslims continue to be the object of derision and attack. 6 In this sense, Islamophobia, in Sway's perspective, includes violence against Muslims in the form of physical assaults, verbal abuse, and the vandalizing of property, especially of Islamic institutions including mosques, Islamic schools, and Muslim cemeteries. Islamophobia also includes discrimination in employment where Muslims are faced with unequal opportunities; discrimination in the provision of health services; exclusion from managerial positions and jobs of high responsibility; and exclusion from political and governmental posts. Ultimately, Islamophobia also comprises prejudice in the media, literature, and everyday conversation. 7 In this paper, the term Islamophobia refers to derogatory assumptions, theories, practices and policies toward Islam and Muslims as understood by the Islamists in Indonesia. Islamophobia has been fueled in particular by theorists, such as Fukuyama and Huntington, who predict that Islam will be the next archenemy of the West. 8 The vilification of Islam along with the US policies in carrying out the "War on Terror," (including the use of military measures against any person, group, or country that is suspected of harboring terrorists and terrorism) are interpreted by Islamists as a war against Islam and Muslims. Although the United States' political strategy in the War on Terror is to tackle the growing threat of terrorism, the radical Islamists in Indonesia utilize the rhetoric of self-defense to to stand up for Islam in the face of the Western threat and to promote Islam as the solution to all the social and cultural decadence caused by the post-colonial legacy.
Radical Islamism in Indonesia: Political Responses
As part of the War on Terror, the US named several Indonesian pesantren, 9 mass organizations, and controversial figures such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as terrorist threats. Islamist groups like Front Pembela Islam (Front of the Defenders of Islam, FDI), 10 Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly), 11 and Hizbut Tahrir (Party of Liberation) responded to this labeling as an intervention in Indonesian home affairs. The Islamists consequently displayed their anger at the United States' foreign policies in Afghanistan and Iraq through a wave of anti-American demonstrations in major cities, including Jakarta, Makasar, Medan, and Solo. 12 These Islamist groups perceive America as a threat to Islam and to Muslim freedom.
Diverse forms of modern religious revivalism in Indonesia stretch back to the early twentieth century. Among those that continue to have influence are the Muhammadiyah (the Way of Muhammad), 13 the Nahdatul Ulama (the Awakening of Religious Scholars), 14 20 The increasing support of the implementation of Islamic Shari'ah and its elements seems, however, less surprising when we consider the context of a corrupt legal system that ignores social justice.
At another level, the government's delegation of power to its provincial counter-parts has also had significant implications for the spread of Islamic influence. The implementation of Islamic Law in the province of Aceh, for instance, reflects the indigenous desire of the Acehnese to be distinct from the rest of the Indonesian archipelago, since the province considers itself the "Porch of Mecca (Serambi Mekah)." Aceh has also striven for the implementation of Islamic Shari'ah for more than 50 years. For this reason, the special treatment of Aceh is a negotiating point for the Central government for resolving the military conflict that has been going on for more than 20 years.
With this decentralization, many local municipalities in West Java, including Cianjur, Garut, Tasikmalaya and Indramayu, have also expressed interest in the application of Shari'ah. They endorse women's veiling, police raids on nightclubs, a more restrictive social role for women, religious education for Muslim youth to supplement public secular schools, and the increased uses of Arabic names and symbols. However, it is not quite clear what they mean by Shari'ah. They seem to assume that Shari'ah deals with the ritual aspects of Islam in public life. When it comes to Shari'ah, the Islamists have no uniform voice. Referencing the results of a survey conducted at the State Islamic University in Bandung, Afif Muhammad, Director of the Graduate Studies Program, explains that Shari'ah for the Muslim majority connotes fiqh (the understanding of Islamic jurisprudence), not the overall system of life based on the Qur'an and hadith. 21 On the basis of the growing interest in the implementation of Islam at the personal and social levels, can we say that radicalism has become epidemic? Based on the same survey done by the Center for the Study of Islam Anti-Americanism refers to "perceptions and attitudes of individuals or groups that display dislike, hatred, or intolerance to America." In the United States, as T.P. Thornton suggests, "The terms 'anti-Americanism' and 'terrorism' are nearly synonymous" 23 in that the US tends to equate anti-Americanism with terror-or with the potential employ terror against United States' interests." 24 Thorton argues that "the high visibility of the United States and its perceived association with injustice make it a particularly attractive target." 25 This is precisely what Ismail Yusanto, the leader of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, believes. He admits that he hates the United States and that his hatred is triggered by American attitudes and behaviors that do not mirror just, humanistic, and democratic values. He adds that the United States' behaviors hurt Muslims and innocent people. 26 AntiAmericanism is rooted in the experience of Muslims' encounter with the War on Terror and with a foreign policy that targets Islam and Muslims.
Despite the fears and declarations of many in the West, anti-Americanism is not always violent, even if it is widespread. As Louis Cantori says, "Anti-Americanism among Muslims in the world, like its political extreme of terrorism, originates as a reaction to American foreign policy. It does not originate in the deep reservoirs of evil, hatred, and irrationality attributed to it by American policymakers." 27 What has triggered antiAmerican sentiments has been the perception the Islamists have derived from United States activities that America stands as an enemy of Muslims or Islam. Laskar Jihad, for example, perceives "the United States as Zionist," and "Zionism is the enemy of Islam." 28 This kind of anti-American sentiment is not unique to Indonesia; leaders in many Islamic countries or those with large Muslim populations argue that America's perception "…as an ardent advocate of the Zionist project is …the principal theme in the analysis of Muslim anti-Americanism." 29 The equation of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism should not come as a surprise since Islamists, like Laskar Jihad and Hizbut Tahrir, perceive both the United States and Israel as the enemy of Islam. 30 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a control issue for radical Islamists. They generally perceive the US support for Israel to be without any reservation. Farid Wadjdi, a member of Hizbut Tahrir, argues that "when Islamists defending the Palestinian land from the Israeli occupation are accused as terrorists, the Zionist Israeli treatment of Palestine is seen as defending its independence."
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Wadjdi is also critical of the War on Terror because of its indiscriminate violence. He argues that even though the US tells the world that the War on Terror is not the war on Islam, proof to the contrary is evident in the casualties of the war. He believes that the real purpose of the War on Terror is to undermine Muslim resistance to capitalist colonization. 32 America's Islamophobia generates anti-American sentiments among many Muslim populations, including that of Indonesia. The findings of the Center for the Study of Islam and Society, whose national survey interviewed over 1,200 respondents across 25 provinces, show that anti-American Muslim behavior includes: 1) demonstrations against United States' foreign policies that are perceived to hurt Muslims; 2) demonstrations against United States' foreign policies that support Israel's aggression toward Palestine; 3) demonstrations against the United States' invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq; 4) boycotts of American goods and service; 5) demonstrations against United States' interference in the domestic affairs of Indonesia; 6) convincing others that the United States is a threat to the Ummah (community); and 7) pressures to terminate diplomatic relationships with the US. 33 The percentage of those participating in these activities ranges from 1.5 to 2.1% except for point six entailing speech at 8.8%. This survey shows that active anti-Americanism is extremely low and occurs in the capital cities.
The survey also suggests that American-Indonesian relations at the state level are good in a general sense. 34 The survey found that only two out of ten adult Indonesians mentioned America as the country they hate most. Muslims are generally moderate and tolerant in their outlook towards others. According to a survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society in 2001 , 2002 , and 2004 , Muslims have a higher degree of tolerance towards people of other faiths than do the minority communities with which they live. In 2004, 44% of Muslims responded that they had no objection to Christians teaching at public schools where Muslim children attend. 44% of Muslim Indonesians surveyed stated that Christians should be able to build a church wherever they want. While the survey also revealed that very few dislike Jews (7%) and Christians (6.5%), they had far less tolerance for communists (57.6%). The survey also suggests that Muslims value political participation. In the first election, 71.6% of Muslims surveyed stated that they believed that democracy is the best system to promote good governance and civil society. Muslims expressed less dissatisfaction with the national-oriented party (19.7%) than they did with the Islamic party (60.5%). 
Conclusion

